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I. Introduction  
The labor market in Turkey has been characterized by increasing segmentation into formal and informal 
sectors. Alongside the momentum of economic growth and development in the post-1980 market 
liberalization period, the informal sector continues to account for a substantial and growing segment of 
the labor market, as high as 56 per cent non-agricultural employment and 36 per cent of non-agricultural 
wage earners in 2007.   
The growth of the informal labor market in Turkey has been deemed inevitable by demand-and supply-
side factors simultaneously. On the demand side, increasing integration of Turkey into global markets, 
has intensified price competition and the pressures to minimize production costs in the tradables sectors. 
This has lead to a demand-lead growth in informal sector employment. On the supply side, massive 
rural-to-urban migration patterns, combined with privatization and declining share of public sector 
employment, has provided a work force ready to work under the dire conditions of informal sector 
employment.  
This paper attempts to explore the current nature of labor market segmentation in Turkey into formal 
and informal sectors, and also to trace its transformation through time in a period of integration into 
global markets. We use Household Labor Force data for the 1988-2007 period, covering two decades of 
liberalization policies in Turkey. Based on this data, the paper explores the transformation in the formal 
versus informal sector shares of non-agricultural employment, in particular wage and salary earners, the 
worker profiles in the respective sectors with respect to age, education, tenure and gender; as well as the 
distribution of formal versus informal sector employment across different industries, occupations and 
regions.  
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The paper explores the changes in the size of the wage gap between the two sectors through 
time, as well as any structural transformation in the dynamics of wage determination in the 
respective sectors. Finally using the Oaxaca decomposition method, we analyze the extent to 
which the formal-informal sector wage gap can be accounted for by productivity differences 
as reflected in human capital endowments, as well as industry and geographical distribution, 
versus unexplained differences.  
The following section of the paper first addresses the concept of informality in labor markets 
and its different working definition. Section III provides a theoretical background of the 
treatment of formal versus informal sectors in labor markets, which has been explored for 
most part in the context of the segmentation literature, followed by an analytical summary of 
empirical findings from different countries as well as Turkey. Section IV introduces our data 
and methodology. Section V presents the results regarding informal versus formal sector 
transformations and wage differentials in the Turkish labor market from 1988 to 2007. 
Section VI concludes.   
 
II. Theoretical Framework for the Formal – Informal Divide  
Although the “formal” versus the “informal” divide has been first put forth by Hart (1971) in 
his analysis of the Ghanaian economy,2 the origins of this concept can be traced back to the 
so-called developmentalist or modernist economists of the 1950s, whose characterization of 
developing economies rested on “economic dualism”, the coexistence of “traditional” and 
“modern” sectors side by side. According to Lewis (1954), a member of this school of 
thought, the excess supply of labor that exists in the traditional (rural agricultural) sector in 
developing countries constitutes the main source of their economic dynamism. This excess 
supply of labor would be captured by the modern sector (urban industry) as the 
industrialization process proceeds, allowing industrial wage rates to remain low so long as the 
traditional sector exists. Lewis assumed this would result in high industrial profits and high 
rates of investment and accumulation. Hence, he pointed out the hidden potential of 
developing economies. As the labor surplus of the traditional sector is absorbed by the 
modern sector through the course of development, Lewis foresees that the average wage rate 
                                                            
2 Hart (1971) defines the informal sector as the category which consists of self-employed workers. 
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would gradually start to increase, and differences between the two sectors would erode; or in 
other words, the traditional sector would be eliminated through the process of development.  
While the elimination of the traditional rural agricultural sector in the course of development 
can be said to have taken place to a limited degree, what most developing economies have 
experienced instead was the emergence of a new economic dualism in the urban industrial 
context: The coexistence of a low-productivity, poor working conditions, low-income urban 
production sector side by side and in interaction with a high-productivity, relatively better 
working conditions, high-income production sector. As such the conceptualization in 
development economics of a dualistic economy entailing the “traditional” and the “modern” 
sectors evolved in time into discussions of “formal” and “informal” sectors of production and 
employment.  
There have been several conceptualizations and definitions of the dividing line between the 
formal and the informal. A seminal ILO Report (1972) on Kenya introduces the first 
definition of “informal” sector production which entails subsistence level economic activities 
carried out by rural-to-urban migrants who have been unable to access entry into the modern 
urban labor markets. The report characterizes the informal sector as follows (ILO, 1972: 
quoted by Bromley, 1978): Unregulated and competitive markets where workers can enter 
easily; it relies on indigenous resources; family ownership of enterprises, small scale of 
operation with labor intensive and adapted technology; and labor skills acquired outside the 
formal school system. 
As the ILO definition of informality included some level of ambiguity, the search for 
alternative definitions continued. The Fifteenth International Conference of Labor 
Statisticians which was held in 1993 characterized the informal sector as the part of the 
economy consisting of the categories of family enterprises with unpaid family and self 
employed workers, small scale enterprises (number of workers below some level) and the 
enterprises which do not have a legal status or which employ unregistered workers. In course 
of time, varying definitions of informal sector have commonly made use of the two criteria 
suggested in this above description; namely, the size of the enterprise (usually defined by the 
number of workers)3 and the legal standing of the enterprise (non-tax paying) or the legal 
status of employment, i.e. the social security registration status of the workers. While the 
                                                            
3 The number of employees working in the enterprise which is used to identify the scale of the workplace differs 
by the aim of the research and the country specific economic conditions. 
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scale of the enterprise is considered as an indicator of informality at level of the enterprise, the 
social security status is taken as a measure of informality at the level of the worker. 
While the social security status of employment is a straightforward measure of informal 
sector, the scale of operation deserves more consideration. The reason for using the scale of 
enterprise as a measure of informality lies in the difficulty of monitoring and controlling 
small-scale economic units. These firms can employ unregistered workers or avoid certain 
legal obligations with much more ease than larger enterprises. On the other hand, it is also 
commonly observed that large scale enterprises revert to employment of unregistered workers 
as means for cost minimization and the increasingly relevant practice of subcontracting has 
become a suitable tool for these enterprises to perform informal economic activities. Because 
of this reason, the scale of enterprise is usually regarded as a necessary but not sufficient 
indicator of informality. 
 
Economic Dualism and the Labor Market Segmentation Models 
Interacting with the literature on the dualistic structure of developing country economies and 
the formal-informal divide, there has been a surge of literature in developed country contexts, 
suggesting the structural segmentation of their labor markets into primary sectors with good 
jobs and secondary sectors with bad jobs. These labor market segmentation theories which 
originated from “the dual theory” of Doeringer and Piore (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Piore 
1975) strived to provide answers for a number of policy concerns of the 1960s and 1970s on 
labor market discrimination, employment and training of disadvantaged workers (immigrants, 
racial minorities, women), technological change and structural unemployment. 
The analytical framework usually considers the labor market consisting of two main 
categories, the primary and secondary segments. The primary segment is characterized by 
highly qualified, permanent and upwardly mobile jobs in large-scale enterprises which enjoy 
higher wage levels, including social security, labor law protection and better working 
conditions. The secondary segment, on the other hand, is characterized by the reverse job 
characteristics, with little qualification requirements, temporary positions, no career ladders 
attached, low wage levels, limited access to social security coverage and labor law protective 
measures if any, and poor working conditions. A basic proposition of the segmentation 
theories has been that wage and employment setting mechanisms in the primary sector are 
ruled by a protective institutional structure while that in the secondary sector they are subject 
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to the raw forces of supply and demand. An additional proposition is the presumed lack of 
mobility of workers from the secondary to the primary sector jobs. As such the dualistic 
nature of the labor market provides an additional explanation for the part of the wage 
differentials unexplained by the human capital variables alone. 
The empirical studies analyzing wage differentials based on the dual / segmented labor market 
approach use different categorical measures in order to define the segments.4 These measures 
are based on job characteristics rather than human capital variables as the theory implies. In 
developed country applications, job characteristics have been typically defined on the basis of 
industry, product market, occupation characteristics, training requirements as well as 
institutional factors such as collective bargaining coverage (Leontaridi 1998). Applications of 
segmentation theory in developing economy contexts, on the other hand, have commonly 
made use of the informal versus the formal sector divide in defining primary and secondary 
segment jobs. Hence jobs were assumed to be allocated to different segments based on the 
size and legal status of the firm and social security registration status of workers.  
 
This common methodology used in the empirical work is based on a priori segment 
determination, i.e. the number of segments in the labor market are predetermined by the 
researcher on the basis of job or industry characteristics. Then tests are conducted for 
differences in the wage equations for each segment using an augmented human capital 
earnings function. The expectation is that the returns to human capital, workplace and job 
characteristics will exhibit structural differences between the two sectors; and possibly that 
human capital variables will perform less well in secondary labor markets. The method of a 
priori segmentation has been subject to a critique of truncation or selection bias. Accordingly, 
distribution of workers among the different segments of the labor market, such as formal and 
informal sectors for example, might not necessarily be a random distribution but rather 
reflective of unobserved worker characteristics and choices such as abilities and motivation. 
Ignoring this selection mechanism would potentially cause a bias in wage estimation results. 
Hence the non-random allocation of workers across the different sectors must be taken into 
account in the estimation of the wage equations. As explained further in Section IV, this 
critique has been commonly addressed through employment of an additional selection term to 
correct for the so-called selectivity bias.  
                                                            
4 This refers to applied empirical work which is based on the method of a priori segment determination where the 
number of segments in labor market are predetermined by the researcher on the basis of job or industry 
characteristics. 
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III. Findings on Formal- Informal Labor Market Segmentation in Developing Countries 
While there is a wide array of empirical work on labor market segmentation in developed 
economies, primarily the U.S. and U.K. labor markets, for the purposes of this paper we will 
limit our scope to studies on developing economies’ labor markets where segmentation and 
resulting wage differentials is commonly explored along the formal-informal sector divide.  
In a comprehensive study on three Latin American countries (Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela) 
and three transition countries (Albania, Georgia, Ukraine), Pages and Stampini (2007) explore 
the labor market segmentation across formal and informal sectors and self-employment The 
skilled and unskilled labor markets are analyzed separately in order to see if the segmentation 
is an exclusive feature of the unskilled labor force. Using longitudinal data, the study also 
investigates mobility patterns and the wage differentials across the segments. Their results 
suggest that there is a wage premium in the formal sector compared to the informal sector in 
Latin American countries while there is no wage differential in transition countries. They also 
found evidence of mobility from informal jobs to formal jobs while the mobility between the 
formal sector and self-employment is limited. Finally relying on the obtained results they 
concluded that there is no significant difference between skilled and the unskilled labor in the 
contexts of wage differentials and mobility. 
Another study with mixed results for different countries is by Marcouiller, Castilla and 
Woodruff (1997) using survey data from urban areas in El Salvador, Mexico and Peru. The 
paper analyzes the determination of sectoral allocation and whether informal sector workers 
earn lower than the observationally identical workers in the formal sector. They find that that 
there exists a wage premium  associated with working in the formal sector in El Salvador and 
Peru, yet that the wage advantage is observed for the informal sector in Mexico. 
A number of studies use more complicated layers of segmentation than simply the formal-
informal divide. Gindling (1991) for instance, in her study of labor market segmentation  in 
San Jose, Costa Rica, identifies the segments as the public and private formal sectors and the 
private formal and informal sectors. First using a chow test, the study compares the estimated 
wage equations for different sectors and then tests the hypothesis that based on the observed 
characteristics, identical workers have higher expected wages in the upper sector than in the 
lower sectors. Gindling (1991) reports that for 100% of workers in the public and private-
formal sectors, the expected wage in the public sector is higher than private-formal sector and 
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for 91% of the private sector workers the expected wage in the private-formal sector is greater 
than the informal sector. 
Heintz and Posel (2008) set out on an investigation of the puzzle of high unemployment co-
existing with relatively low level of informal employment in South Africa. Using 2004 Labor 
Force Survey data, they estimate earning equations and report a substantial earning gap 
between formal and informal sectors as well as an earnings differential between the types of 
informal employment. They consider these results as an indication of complex segmentation 
in the South African labor market.  Similarly, Günther and Launov (2006) investigate the 
hypothesis that the informal labor market also has a dual structure with one part of it being 
competitive to the formal sector and the other part being the result of segmentation. Taking 
into account the selection bias induced by the employment decision, they estimate wage 
equations for the upper and lower segments of informal sector for the urban labor market in 
Cote d’lvoire. They found that the upper segment in the informal labor market has a wage 
premium. Relying on the results they concluded that the informal sector entails both 
competitive and segmented employment. 
 
Empirical Work on Formal-Informal Segmentation in the Turkish Labor Market 
There are only a handful of studies exploring the formal-informal labor market segmentation 
in the Turkish labor market, and each study uses cross-section data belonging to different 
years. The first empirical work on the subject is by Ercan and Tunalı (1997), which uses the 
1988 Household Labor Force Survey data to analyze the segmentation in the labor market by 
examining the wage differentials. They define the segments as the primary segment which 
consists of the labor force who work in the large-scale firms (more than 10 employees) and 
the secondary segment representing the part of labor force working in small-scale firms (10 or 
fewer employees). In order to identify the effect of segmentation on the wage levels they 
included the firm size variable as an additional explanatory variable in the estimated wage 
equations. The results show that the average monthly wage level in the large-scale firms is 
27% greater than the small scale firms. 
Tansel (1999a) analyzes wage differentials between formal and informal sectors in the 
Turkish labor market by using 1994 Household Expenditure Survey. The sectors are identified 
according to the social security status of the labor force; the wage earners who are covered by 
a social security program constitute the formal sector and the wage earners who are not 
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covered by any social security program make up the informal sector. In order to take account 
of sample selection bias in the wage estimations, the study  first estimates the allocation of 
individuals in different sectors; this is followed by estimation of wage equations for both 
sectors; and for men and women separately. The results suggest that when controlled for 
observational characteristics and sample selection, the wages in the formal sector are at least 
twice as high as the wages in the informal sector at all education and experience levels. 
The most recent study is by Levent, Taştı and Sezer (2004) which uses the 2003 Household 
Labor Force Survey. The study employs social security registration status of the worker as 
well as the legal structure and the size of the firm in order to identify the formal and informal 
sectors. To analyze the effect of segmentation on wage levels they estimated wage equations 
including dummy variables for different sector categories. Besides they estimated separate 
wage equations for the corresponding sectors. The results indicate the existence of a 
substantial wage premium in the formal sector after controlling for observable human capital 
and job related variables. 
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
In order to explore whether there is a segmented structure of the Turkish labor market across 
the formal and informal divide, this paper focuses particularly on non-agricultural wage and 
salary workers. The characteristics of these two sectors are highly consistent with the features 
of the primary and secondary segments defined within the dual labor market approach.  The 
working definition of informal sector employed in this paper makes use of both the scale of 
workplace operation and worker social security status criteria discussed in Section II above. 
We define informal sector wage and salary earners as all workers who are employed without 
social security registration independent of the size of the workplace plus all those workers 
who are employed at workplaces with 10 or less workers, independent of their social security 
coverage. As shown by the data in Appendix 1, these two categories overlap to a large extent. 
We adopt a two-stage estimation suggested by Trost and Lee (1984) to analyze the wage 
differentials between formal and informal sectors in the Turkish labor market for the years 
1988 and 2007. The underlying idea of this two-stage modeling is the fact that the distribution 
of workers among formal and informal sectors is not random and that the unobserved worker 
characteristics influencing the sectoral allocation also have an influence on their wages. To 
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avoid the potential bias that arises from ignoring the non-random selection of workers to these 
sectors, a selectivity bias correcting term must be employed in estimation of the wage 
equations (Heckman and Hotz, 1986).  
Assuming an individual faces M mutually exclusive alternatives to choose from, the market 
wage level in the sth alternative and the maximum utility attainable from choosing the sth 
alternative are given by the following equations (Lee, 1983; Trost and Lee, 1984; 
Bourguignon et al. 2001):  
(1) ssss uxW += β        
(2) ssszV ηγ +=    ,     s=1,2,…,M 
where W and V denote, respectively, the wage level and the maximum utility. All variables 
( sx and sz ) are assumed to be exogenous with 0),|( =zxuE s  and 2),|( ss zxuVar σ= . The 
wage level for the sth category is observed if and only if the individual chooses the sth 
category, which happens when the maximum utility they obtain from choosing the sth 
category is higher than choosing any other alternative.  
(3) jsjs VV ≠> max    
A selectivity bias occurs in wage regression if the disturbances in the wage and utility 
equations are correlated, in which case Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of sβ  will be 
inconsistent. 
Note that the expression in Eq. (3) is equivalent to 
(4) sssz εγ >    
where )(max sjsjs V ηε −= ≠ .  
 Assuming that the stochastic parts of the utility functions ( sη ) are independent and 
identically distributed with a Gumbel distribution, McFadden (1974) shows that this 
specification leads to multinomial logit model, where the probability that the sth alternative 
will be chosen is given by   
(5) P(zsγ s > εs) = exp(zsγ s)
exp(z jγ j )
j=1
M∑
.    
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Parameter estimates for the utility function ( jγˆ ) are obtained by maximising the likelihood 
function for this model.   
In order to obtain the selectivity corrected estimates for the wage regression parameters, sβ , 
Lee (1983) proposes to apply the transformation εs* = Φ−1 F (zsγ s)[ ], where Φ  is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function, and F(zsγ s)  is the cumulative distribution function 
for sε , which is given by  
 (6) F(zsγ s) = exp(εs)
exp(εs) + exp(z jγ j )
j=1, j≠s
M∑
 
 Note that this transformation is strictly increasing, and the random variable it transforms (εs*) 
has a standard normal distribution. Assuming that the random variables us and sε are jointly 
normally distributed, the expected value of the disturbance term, us, conditional on the sth 
category being chosen is given by the following expression   
(7) E(us | zsγ s > εs) = −σ sρs
φ Φ−1 F(zsγ s)[ ]( )
F(zsγ s)  
where φ  is the standard normal density and sρ is the correlation between us and εs*. The wage 
equation (Eq.1) then takes the following form: 
(8) 
[ ]( )
s
ss
ss
sssss vzF
zF
xW +Φ−=
−
)(
)(1
γ
γφρσβ  
where sv  is an independent random term. In the second part of this equation, the selectivity 
term ( λs) is calculated by using the results of the multinomial logit estimations: 
(9) λs = −
φ Φ−1 F(zsγ s)[ ]( )
F (zsγ s) = −
φ Hs( )
Φ Hs( )  
where F(zsγ s) = exp(zsγ s)
exp(z jγ j )
j=1
M∑
, i.e. the probability of the individual selecting the sth alternative.  
A consistent estimate for wage equalition parameter vector ( sβ ) could be obtained by 
including this term in the wage equation, which is then estimated by OLS.  
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The second term of the wage equation (Eq.8) shows the difference between the wage level of 
an individual who is self-selected into a particular sector ( λ ≠ 0) and an individual in the same 
sector with the same observed characteristics, but is assigned randomly into that sector 
( λ = 0). Sign of the coefficient of the selection term (σ sρs) will therefore signal the dynamics 
of the selection mechanism. Noting that the sign of the selection term is negative by 
definition, a significant negative parameter estimate for this term will imply a positive sign for 
ρs5, the correlation between us and εs* . This could be interpreted as follows: Unobserved 
characteristics that are increasing the probability of an individual being in a particular sector 
also have an increasing impact on the wage that the individual receives in that sector. 
Similarly, a significantly positive sign for the selection term will imply a negative sign for ρs, 
which signals that unobserved characteristics that are increasing the probability of an 
individual being in a particular sector have a decreasing impact on the wage that the 
individual receives in that sector. 
In order to identify the sources of wage differentials between sectors, we use the Oaxaca 
decomposition, which in the most general form could be written as:  
(10) lnw f − ln wi = ′ x f ( ˆ β f − β*) + ′ x i(β *− ˆ β i) + (x f − x i ′ ) β *  
where f and i, respectively, stand for the formal and informal sectors, wln  denote the mean 
log wage, x ′ ’s are vectors of mean values of the explanatory variables in the wage 
regressions, βˆ ’s are the estimated coefficients, and *β  is the estimated non-discriminatory 
wage structure.  
In his original work, Oaxaca (1973) suggests the adoption of the wage structure either for the 
advantaged or the disadvantaged group as the non-discriminatory wage structure (i.e. *β  ) for 
the decomposition. Following Oaxaca (1973), various studies seek to find the appropriate 
representation for the wage structure in the absence of discrimination. Reimers (1983), for 
example, uses the arithmetic mean of the structures for the two groups while Cotton (1988) 
takes a simple weighted average of the observed structures for the two groups where the 
weights are proportions of the groups in the labour market. Neumark (1988), on the other 
hand, suggests to use the wage structure obtained from a pooled sample of both. After 
comparing four alternative approaches, Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) obtain that Neumark’s 
                                                            
5 Note thatσ s is always positive. 
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(1988) approach of using the pooled sample yields the smallest estimated standard errors for 
every estimated differential.  
Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), we use the following expression for decomposition:   
(11)  
lnw f − ln wi = (x f − x i ′ ) ˆ β p + ′ x f ( ˆ β f − ˆ β p ) + ′ x i( ˆ β p − ˆ β i)[ ]+ ( ˆ λ f − ˆ λ i) ˆ θ p + ˆ λ f ( ˆ θ f − ˆ θ p ) + ˆ λ i( ˆ θ p − ˆ θ i)[ ]
 
where p stands for the pooled sample for all non-agricultural wage earners. wln  denote the 
mean log wage, x ′ ’s are vectors of mean values of the explanatory variables in the wage 
regressions, βˆ ’s are the estimated coefficients, ˆ λ ’s are the selectivity terms that are 
calculated using multinomial logit estimations, and ˆ θ ’s are the parameter estimates for the 
selectivity terms.   
The first term on the right hand side represents the total wage differential due to differences in 
the characteristics of workers (differences in education level, experience, occupation, etc.) and 
the second term in the brackets is the part of the wage differential that cannot be explained 
with the variation in the individual characteristics. This unexplained part is accepted as being 
due to differences in wage setting behavior of the two sectors. The other terms on the right 
hand side represent the wage differential due to the sample selection correction and they 
include both explained and unexplained parts of the wage differential. 
 
We use micro-level data obtained from 1988 and 2007 Household Labor Force Surveys 
(HLFS) which are carried out by TURKSTAT. The 1988 HLFS is the first nationwide survey 
which implemented ILO standards and was conducted with 22,320 households. The 2007 
HLFS, on the other hand, has a much wider sample of 129,527 households, and was the most 
recent survey data available at the time we started this study. 
We restricted the dataset to individuals who are aged between15-65.6 Agricultural workers as 
well as casual employees are also excluded from the data set. We defined the informal sector 
as including all non-agricultural wage earners who are not registered in a social security 
program (independent of size of workplace) and all workers who are working in a workplace 
with 10 or fewer employees. Since the 1988 and 2007 HLFS do not include any information 
about the ownership structure of the workplace, unfortunately, we cannot distinguish the 
                                                            
6 The lower age limit is chosen to be 15 as it is the minimum legal age that a person can be employed. 65 is the 
upper limit as it is the retirement age in Turkey.    
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private sector from the public sector. The ownership of the workplace may affect the wage 
setting behavior and we pay attention to this issue in interpreting the results.  
 
V. Findings 
An overview of labor market transformations in Turkey 
The transformation of the dualistic structure of the economy through the industrialization 
process as predicted by Lewis can be observed to some extent in Turkey as well. While the 
overwhelming majority of total employment used to be in agriculture in the 1950’s (as high as 
85% in 1950), by the 2000’s, it had declined to as low as a quarter (25% in 2008).  
Nevertheless, industrial expansion seems to have generated only limited absorption capacity 
for the agricultural labor surplus. These limitations exert themselves primarily through two 
mechanisms. While segmentation in terms of the traditional versus the modern employment 
sectors is gradually being phased out, it is being replaced by segmentation by gender and by 
the urban, modern formal-informal sector divide.  
In regards to the increasing gender segmentation of the labor market, the mechanism of 
industrial or urban modern sector absorption of the agricultural labor surplus can be said to 
have worked to a large extent for men but not women. Women have instead increasingly 
opted for non-participation.7 Hence an important structural characteristic of the labor market 
in Turkey has been a very low and declining labor force participation rate from an already low 
57.5 per cent in 1988 to an even lower 46.2 per cent in 2007. This is below the OECD average 
participation rate of 52.5 per cent (2007) of which Turkey is a member; and substantially 
lower than the EU-27 average of 65.4 per cent (2007), of which Turkey is an aspiring 
candidate member. The reason for low and declining average participation rates has to do with 
very low female participation, typically observed in the Middle Eastern Region. While with 
the male participation rate of 70.9 per cent (2007) is in line with the OECD and EU-27 male 
average participation rates; the 25.1 per cent female participation rate (2007) ranks Turkey as 
at the bottom of not only OECD and EU leagues but also amongst the bottom ten of world 
nations (UNDP 2008). 
The gender disparity in participation rates is closely intertwined with disparity in the 
distribution of the employed according to work status (Table 1). While the majority of men 
(51%) in 2007 are in the category of wage and salary earners, followed by the self-employed 
                                                            
7 See Ilkkaracan and Tunalı (2009) for a detailed discussion. 
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category as the second largest (29%), the majority of women are divided equally between the 
two categories of unpaid family workers, predominantly agricultural workers (40%) and wage 
and salary earners (40%). Hence the “traditional” versus “modern” dualism a la Lewis 
continues to exist for the female labor force well into the 2000’s. 
Nevertheless the category of unpaid (agricultural) family workers has constituted a declining 
share of total employment from 14 and 66 per cent for men and women respectively in 1988, 
to 6 and 40 per cent in 2007 parallel to the declining share of agricultural employment in total 
employment as mentioned above (Table 1). Despite the substantial contraction in this 
traditional form of employment however, we observe only a very limited decline in the share 
of the informal sector in overall employment from a high of  three quarters in 1988 to a lower 
but still substantially high share of 69 per cent in 2007 (Table 2). The continued 
predominance of unpaid agricultural work for women accounts for some of the substantially 
high share of the informal sector in total employment. Yet another source has been the 
segmentation of the so-called modern, non-agricultural labor market into formal and informal 
sectors. A stable 59-60 per cent of men’s non-agricultural employment has been in the 
informal sector over the past two decades, and amongst the non-agricultural male wage and 
salary workers, again a stable 36 to 38 per cent (Table 2).  As far as women’s non-
agricultural employment is concerned, the share of the informal sector has been on a rise from 
40 to 51 per cent; and for non-agricultural female wage and salary workers from 25 to 36 per 
cent, eleven percentage points increase in a span of two decades. 
While the share of male informal sector employment amongst non-agriculture wage earners 
has remained a substantial but stable 36-37 per cent, Table 3 shows that the inter-sectoral 
wage differential has undergone a major transformation. In 1988, the average formal sector 
male employee earned 37 per cent more than his informal sector counterpart, while by 2007, 
the difference had almost tripled to 92 per cent.  For women the inter-sectoral wage 
differential was already substantial in 1988; the average female formal sector wage worker 
earned 91 per cent more than her informal sector counterpart. By 2007, the already high 
female inter-sectoral wage differential had increased even more, to a high of 113 per cent.   
Alongside the increasing wage disadvantage of the informal sector, it also suffers from 
substantially longer working hours than in the formal sector (Table 3).  The average weekly 
working hours have increased for all categories of workers from 1988 to 2007, for men and 
women both in formal and informal sectors. There is a substantial gap of 8 to 9 hours of extra 
working hours for informal sector men; with only a slight increase from 1988 to 2007. While 
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for women, the inter sectoral gap in working hours has almost doubled from 3.6 hours in 1988 
to 6.4 hours in 2007. 
Figure 1 shows the educational profile of the two sectors. As expected, the formal sector in 
both years enjoys relatively better educated workers; and the educational level of the average 
worker has increased for both men and women in both the formal and the informal sectors 
through these 20 years. It is interesting to note here, however, that the informal sector is not 
the exclusive realm of the uneducated. There is a non-negligible share of high school and 
university graduates who are employed in the informal sector. Particularly in the case of 
women, as high as 34 per cent of female high school graduates and 14 per cent of female 
university graduates are in informal sector employment. The rest of the changes in the typical 
formal versus informal worker profiles namely age, occupation and industry are provided in 
Appendix 2. 
Figures 2 through 7 explore the changes from 1988 to 2007 in the inter-sectoral wage and 
working hours differentials as well as the share of informal sector employment by education, 
age, industry, occupation, rural-urban location and region. When explored by education level, 
the largest inter-sectoral wage differential is for the secondary school graduates (formal wage 
80 per cent more than the informal wage), followed by high school graduates 67 per cent), 
both of which also have the largest differential in working hours. By contrast in 1988, the 
largest gaps were in the lowest education category of illiterate (39 per cent), and the highest 
level of university (47 per cent) both of which remained stable to 2007 (Figure 2).  
As expected the share of informal sector employment is largest in the youngest age category 
of 15-24 (a stable 57 per cent) followed by the oldest age category 55-64 (40 per cent in 1988, 
and as high as 54 per cent in 2007). Yet of the prime working age 25-34 employees as high as 
36 per cent are also employed in the informal sector (Figure 3). The oldest category of 55-64 
also has the highest wage gap (121 per cent) followed by the next oldest 45-54 (101 per cent). 
As far as the industrial distribution is concerned, the three sectors of trade  (64 per cent), 
construction (46 per cent) and transportation (40 per cent) have the largest shares of informal 
sector employment where approximately half or more of the wage works are in the informal 
sector. The wage gap in the trade and transportation sectors are 58 and 59 per cent 
respectively, while construction suffers from one of the highest wage gaps at 82 per cent. The 
largest industry wage gap is in the service sector at 98 per cent (Figure 4). The occupational 
distribution proceeds in a manner related to industries. The sales workers have the largest 
participation in informal sector amongst all occupations (58 per cent) with a wage differential 
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of 103 per cent. Yet it is also worth noting here that as high as 32 per cent of managers (with 
the highest wage differential of 130 per cent) and 26 per cent of associate professionals are 
also in the informal sector (Figure 5). 
 
Wage regressions and the Oaxaca Decomposition Analysis 
As explained in Section III, in the first stage of our analysis, we estimate the sectoral 
allocation of individuals by using multinomial logit modeling. We assume that there are five 
mutually exclusive alternatives that the individuals face:8 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
=
kerfamily wor unpaidan  if4
employeran or  employed-self if3
earner   wagea assector  informal in the  workingif2
earner  wagea assector  formal in the  workingif1
marketlabor  in the gnot workin if0
iY  
In the model, education level of the individual is taken as a proxy for their human capital and 
is measured by six dummy variables for illiteracy, literacy without a diploma, primary, 
secondary, high school graduations and a university degree. The other variables considered to 
explain the distribution of individuals among the sectors are; dummies for gender, 
geographical location, residing in urban versus rural area, marital status, age category, being 
the head of household, sectoral status of the head of the household, and the numbers of 
children in the household who are aged 0-4 and 5-14. The models are estimated for the whole 
sample and also separately for male and females. The multinomial logit regression results are 
given in Appendix 3. The estimation results are to a large extent consistent with our 
expectations. As opposed to not working in the labor market, increasing levels of education 
have an increasing impact on the probabilities of being observed in all the other alternatives 
for both male and females, the impact being higher for the formal sector employment. Being 
married increases the probability of males working while it has a decreasing impact, if not 
insignificant, for females. People living in a rural area are more likely to be not working in the 
labor market as opposed to the ones in urban areas.  
In the second stage of the analysis, we use the multinomial logit estimations to calculate the 
selection terms. We then estimate wage equations for the formal and informal sectors 
                                                            
8 The self-employed and employer status are merged in one category due to the small sample size for employers, 
particularly fort he females. 
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including the estimated selection terms as one of the independent variables. The wage 
equations are specified based on the traditional human capital framework (Mincer 1974). 
Natural logarithm of wages is regressed on a set of human capital and some other individual 
and locational characteristics. One of the most important variables in this respect is the 
education level of the individual, which is represented by dummy variables for various levels 
of educational attainment. Job tenure is another variable included in the regressions as a 
measure of productivity. Due to data limitations, age of the individual is represented by 
categorical dummy variables as a proxy for experience.9 The remaining explanatory variables 
in the equations are dummy variables for gender, the region of residence, residing in a rural 
versus urban area. Industry and occupation dummies are also included in the wage estimations 
for the entire sample while a dummy variable for the individual working in a high-qualified 
occupation replaced the occupational dummies in the gender disaggregated regressions.10,11  
Table 4 shows the results of the wage regressions for the entire sample of formal and informal 
sector non-agricultural wage and salary workers for 1988 and 2007. Tables 5 and 6 repeat the 
same set of estimations for the male and female samples separately. The results in the latter 
two tables entail a complex web of variations in wage determination across the three 
dimensions of formal-informal, time and gender, and a full set of cross comparisons across all 
dimensions would generate a long list of interpretations. For a more clear exposition, we 
primarily focus on the estimation for the total sample (Table 4). 
The set of coefficients on education, age and tenure for 1988 (first two columns of Table 4), 
show that the returns to the human capital variables are substantially higher in the informal 
sector than in the formal sector. Holding all other factors constant, being a high school 
graduate, for instance, increased returns to wages by 53 per cent in 1988 as compared to an 
illiterate worker in the informal sector, versus 32 per cent in the formal sector.12  Similarly, 
each additional year of tenure enhanced the wage rate by 1.3 per cent in the informal sector 
versus 0.9 per cent in the formal sector. The 25-34 age category in the informal sector enjoyed 
                                                            
9 The 2007 data only reports the age category that the individual is in. 
10 The “high-qualified” occupation entails legislators, senior officials, managers, professionals, technicians and 
associate professionals. 
11 Industry and occupation dummies are excluded in the gender disaggregated regressions due to few number of 
observations in each category. 
12 As distinct from continuous explanatory variables, the impact of a dummy variable in a semi-logarithmic 
regression is obtained by subtracting 1 from the antilog of the parameter estimate and then multiplying the result 
by 100. For the impact of high school graduation in the formal sector, for example, its impact is calculated as 
(exp(0.423)-1)*100.   
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a wage advantage by 57 per cent relative to the 15-24 base category age group, versus only a 
10 per cent premium for the same age category in the formal sector. 
The finding of relatively higher informal sector returns to human capital variables, is in part, 
contrary to the hypothesis of the segmentation model. The model suggests that returns to 
education, experience and tenure would matter less in the informal sector, because here jobs 
do not have the skill and training requirements that primary sector jobs have. Yet this finding 
can also be pointing towards the heterogenous nature of the informal sector. As mentioned in 
Section II above, a number of studies have argued that the informal sector itself consists of 
two layers; a lower segment with the types of jobs void of skill requirements, and an upper 
segment that is competitive with the formal sector.  
It might also be one of the consequences of the inability of the dataset to distinguish between 
private and public sector within the formal labor market. While public sector jobs have the 
advantage of job security, human capital based wage differentials are narrower than in the 
private sector, with a relatively higher starting wage but a lower cap on maximum pay levels. 
Hence the lower returns to education, experience and tenure in the formal sector, might be in 
part reflective of the effects of the public sector. 13 
Comparing the results on the human capital variables across the two years, we observe that 
returns to education are reduced through time for both formal and informal sector workers, yet 
informal sector returns continue to be superior. A university graduate in the informal sector 
expects to earn 80 per cent higher than an illiterate informal sector worker (holding all other 
factors constant), while her formal counterpart would expect a wage differential of 39 per 
cent. Job tenure seems to have diminished effect in the formal sector, and not significant any 
more in the informal sector. As for the age variable (indicative of work experience), we 
observe a substantial increase in formal sector returns and a decrease in informal sector 
returns such that the gap is reduced for the prime working age (25-44) and  reversed for the 
more experienced workers 45-64 such that formal sector workers enjoy higher returns than 
their informal sector counterparts. 
The coefficients on the industry and occupation dummies in 1988 are indicative of 
substantially wider occupational and industrial wage differentials in the informal sector than 
in the formal sector. The service, trade and manufacturing sectors, where more than half of all 
                                                            
13 To account for the effect of the public sector, we replicated the estimates with a restricted dataset for 1988 
where we excluded the individuals who are covered by the government retirement fund (as this variable is 
available in the 1988 data set). We observed only a negligible change in the estimated results.  
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employment is in the informal sector as noted above, penalize informal sector workers by 
substantial wage reductions. Holding all other factors constant, an informal service industry 
worker in 1988 expected to earn 71 per cent lower wages as compared to the base category of 
mining and quarrying. The informal sector wage penalty for the trade and manufacturing 
industries were as high as 64 and 59 per cent respectively. Similarly occupational categories 
of service-sale workers and elementary occupation workers in the informal sector suffered 
high wage penalties. 
Looking at industry coefficients for 2007, the situation is somewhat different. This time 
formal sector industry wage differentials are substantially higher than in 1988; and also with a 
wider dispersion than in the informal sector in 2007. Formal sector trade and manufacturing 
workers suffer as much as 50 and 31 per cent wage penalties compared to the base industry. 
While trade, service and manufacturing industries still penalize informal sectors the worst, the 
dispersion has narrowed down substantially. It is possible that the substantial and consistent 
presence of informal sector workers in these three industries have also had a diminishing 
effect on formal sector wages, pulling them down closer to the informal sector levels. 
A similar observation holds for regional wage differentials; the regional coefficients point to a 
much wider wage dispersion in the informal sector than in the formal sector in both years. 
This is particularly the case in 2007 as formal sector regional coefficients seem to have 
undergone a substantial reduction. 
The female dummy, while statistically insignificant in 1988 and for the formal sector in 2007, 
exhibits a negative effect for the informal sector in 2007; informal sector women expect to 
earn 14 per cent lower wages than their identical yet male counterparts. This emerging 
negative informal sector female wage effect is observed alongside a 10 percentage point 
increase in the share of informal sector amongst female wage and salary earners. Working in a 
rural area had a negative wage effect only in the informal sector in 1988, while in 2007 this 
held true for both formal and informal rural wages.  
The selectivity terms are statistically significant and positive for both the formal and informal 
sectors in 1988, for the formal sector in 2007; and negative for the informal sector in 2007. 
The parameter for the informal sector is higher than the one obtained for the formal sector in 
1988, implying that in both sectors, the workers who are self-selected into sectors had lower 
wages than those who are randomly assigned. This reducing impact is higher in the informal 
sector. The correlation between the error terms of the wage and sectoral allocation regressions 
is negative, signaling that the unobserved individual characteristics that increase the 
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probabilities of being in these sectors have a decreasing effect on the wages of the individuals 
that are in this sector. The selectivity term for the informal sector in 2007 is negative, 
suggesting that the workers who are self-selected into this sector receive higher wages than 
the randomly selected ones. The correlation between the error terms of the wage and sectoral 
allocation regressions is positive, which indicates that the unobserved characteristics that 
increase the probability of being an informal sector worker have an increasing impact on their 
wage level as well.  Yet in 2007, the substantially higher constant term for formal sector 
workers is also indicative of head start as compared to the informal sector workers. 
Looking at the wage estimations for the male and female samples separately (Tables 5 and 6), 
we observe that most of the observations we made for the total sample hold for the male 
sample as well.14 Yet in the case of the female sample, we note a number of exceptions. By 
contrast to what we observed for the total and the male sample, the returns to both education 
and age-experience seem to perform better in the formal versus the informal sector. That the 
age variable would perform relatively better for women in the formal sector is to be expected 
given the continuous nature of employment for women in the formal sector versus the 
intermittent entry-exit-re-entry type of employment for women in the informal sector due to 
family responsibilities. The constant term for the informal sector is clearly indicative of a 
disadvantaged start. 
The male selectivity term for both sectors in 2007 are positive and statistically significant, and 
the parameter estimate for the formal sector is higher than the estimate for the informal sector 
suggesting that the decreasing effect of the unobservables is higher for the formal sector this 
time. For females, the estimate for the informal sector is negative, suggesting that the female 
workers who are self-selected into this sector receive higher wages than the randomly selected 
ones. The correlation between the error terms of the wage and sectoral allocation regressions 
is positive, which indicates that the unobserved characteristics that increase the probability of 
being a female worker in the informal sector have an increasing impact on their wage level as 
well.    
 
 
 
                                                            
14 Note that in running the gender disaggregated wage regressions, the occupational dummy has been reduced to 
only one category of “high-qualified” occupation and industries have been left our as the small sample size in 
1988 drove most of them to statistical insignificance. 
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The Oaxaca decomposition results: 
In the final part of our analysis, we use the Oaxaca decomposition method in order to identify 
the sources of wage differentials between sectors. In this decomposition method we use the 
findings of wage estimations and explore the relative weights of different factors in observed 
wage differentials between formal and informal segments. There assumed to be two main 
sources of the wage differentials; one – called the “explained” portion of the wage differential 
is associated with the variation in the human capital endowments of workers, namely 
education level, experience, and job tenure; as well as their distribution across the industries, 
occupations and geographic regions . The other source of the wage differential, the so-called 
“unexplained” part entails the differences in the wage setting behavior of these sectors. In 
other words, it stems from differences in the returns to human capital variables, as well as the 
returns to industry, occupation and regional affiliations. 
Comparing the mean log wages in these two sectors (Table 7), in 1988, formal sector workers 
on average earn 51 per cent higher than their counterparts in the informal sector. The gap 
between these two sectors increase substantially in 2007, formal sector employees earning 89 
per cent higher. For females (Table 8), this wage differential is even wider in both years, 
formal sector female workers earning 80.58 per cent higher in 1988 and 103.2 per cent higher 
in 2007.   
As far as the explained and unexplained components of the inter-sectoral wage differentials 
are concerned, we observe a substantial change from 1988 to 2007. In 1988, an important part 
of the wage differential between the formal and the informal sectors is explained by the 
different human capital endowments working in favor of the formal sector wage, namely 
education (0.114 of the total explained part of 0.212), age-experience (0.092) and tenure 
(0.031).  
The unexplained components on returns to education (-0.118) and age-experience (-0.242) on 
the other hand, work in favor of the informal sector wages, contributing to a closing of the gap 
along with the constant term (-0.387).  The unexplained components on returns to industry 
(0.497), occupation (0.163) and geographic region (0.080) affiliation of the worker, on the 
other hand, are also large, yet work to disadvantage informal sector wages. Hence the two 
unexplained components of the wage differentials cancel each other’s effects out, leaving only 
a small unexplained component of the total differential (-0.019). Consequently, in 1988 the 
major source of inter-sectoral wage differential has to do with differences in human capital 
endowments. 
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In 2007, by contrast, the unexplained component (0.624) serves as the more important source 
of the total adjusted differential (0.927). Returns to education (-0.163) and age-experience (-
0.100) continue to narrow the wage gap as in 1988, yet their total effect has been reduced in 
time. Returns to occupation (-0.303) has transformed from being a substantial source in 
widening the gap in 1988 to becoming a factor in narrowing the gap in 2007. The constant 
term (1.146) makes the largest contribution to the observed wage differential between the 
sectors. The explained part in 2007 (0.302) is smaller yet non-negligible. Here industrial 
(0.062) and occupational distribution (0.068) of formal versus informal sector workers 
contribute to widening the wage gap; as well as education (0.106) and age-experience (0.062) 
endowments.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
Exploring the Household Labor Force data in Turkey from 1988 to 2007, we find that in these 
two decades of liberalization and market-lead growth, the non-agricultural informal sector 
becomes an increasingly stable and structural characteristic of the urban labor market. The 
gradual erosion of  the rural traditional agricultural versus the urban modern industrial divide, 
has turned into a different type of segmentation of the modern formal versus modern informal 
sector, with an additional layer of gender segmentation. In these two decades, the overall 
share of the informal sector in total employment declined somewhat due to the falling share of 
traditional agricultural production. Yet the growth of the informal sector in non-agricultural 
employment has served as a new source of informal employment. Women in particular have 
seen their share of informal sector employment increase by as much as ten percentage points. 
In the meantime the wage differential between the two sectors has doubled in the period under 
investigation; and the sources of the wage differences have turned increasingly from human 
capital endowment differences in 1988 to differences in occupational and industrial 
distribution. Another transformation has been that the returns to industry and occupation have 
changed from being a source of the gap in 1988 to factors narrowing the gap in 2007.  
Moreover, the unexplained component that has to do with the constant term has become the 
largest contributor to the wage gap.  This is indicative of a substantial enhancement of the 
head start that the formal sector wages get ahead of the informal sector wages. These point to 
an increasing segmentation of the labor market into its formal and informal components. 
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Yet our results with respect to the wage regressions are not necessarily supportive of the 
typical expectations of segmentation theory. Namely, that the informal – secondary sector 
with “bad”, unstable, transitional and “dead-end” jobs does not provide well defined returns to 
human capital productivity related worker endowments. While this expectation is confirmed 
to some extent with the female sample, we find the opposite for the male sample. For men, 
human capital returns are higher in the informal sector than in the formal. This can be 
interpreted as a utility maximizing behavior by informal sector workers, who negotiate higher 
current returns in compensation for lack of long-term social security premiums. Yet it is 
debatable to what extent one could call this a choice rather than enforced segmentation. 
Alternatively, we have also suggested the possibility of multiple layers within the informal 
sector, an upper segment with mobility into the formal sector and a lower segment without 
mobility. The next step in expanding the work here would be an expansion of the pursuing 
analysis to allow for heterogenity of the informal sector.  
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Table 1: Distribution of workers by employment status: 1988-2007 (%) 
Employment Status  Year  Male  Female  Total 
Regular  1988  42  22  36  2007  53  43  50 
      
Casual  1988   9   5   8  2007   8   6   7 
      
Employer  1988   5   0   4  2007   7   1  6 
      
Self Employed  1988  31   7  24  2007  27  12  23 
      
Unpaid Family Worker  1988  14  66  28  2007   5  38  14 
Source: TURKSTAT 1988-2007 Household Labor Force Surveys 
Table 2: Share of the informal employment in total, non-agricultural and non-
agricultural wage employment by gender: 1988-2007 (%) 
    Year  Male  Female  Total 
Total Employment  1988  71  83  75 
  2007  66  72  67 
         
Non-Agricultural 
Employment 
 1988  59  41  57 
 2007  58  48  56 
         
Non-Agricultural Wage 
Earners 
 1988  36  25  34 
  2007   37   35   36 
Source: TURKSTAT 1988-2007 Household Labor Force Surveys 
Table 3: The average wage level and working hours in the formal and informal 
employment 
    Year    Male Female  Total  
                   
        Formal  Informal Diff. Formal Informal Diff. Formal  Informal Diff. 
Average Hourly 
Wage  1988  1,15  0,88 %37 1,22 0,67 %91 1,16  0,85 %43 
    (1,157)  (2,585)  (2,247) (0,551)  (1,436)  (2,429)  
  2007  4,67  2,43 %92 4,91 2,30 %113 4,73  2,40 %97 
    (3,506)  (2,217)  (4,376) (2,083)  (3,732)  (2,189)  
               
Average 
Weekly 
Working Hours 
 1988  45,2  52,5 %16 41,4 45 %9 44,5  51,6 %16 
 2007  49,4  58,0 %17 45,3 51,7 %14 48,5  56,6 %17 
*Diff.  denotes the differences between the average hourly income levels and average weekly working hours of the sectors 
Wage difference: “Diff.=(Formal-Informal)/Informal” 
Working hours difference: “Diff.=(Informal-Formal)/Formal” 
*Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: TURKSTAT 1988-2007 Household Labor Force Surveys 
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Figure 1: Formal and Informal Employment by Education Level (%) 
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Figure 2: Comparison of the formal and informal employment based on education level 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of the formal and informal employment based on age 
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Figure 4: Comparison of the formal and informal employment based on industry 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of the formal and informal employment based on occupation 
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Figure 6: Comparison of the formal and informal employment based on geographic region 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of the formal and informal employment based on urban-rural and gender 
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Table 4 
WAGE ESTIMATIONS : TOTAL SAMPLE  
                                     1988                 2007 
   
VARIABLES FORMAL INFORMAL FORMAL INFORMAL 
     
Literate 0.050 0.151** 0.053 0.126*** 
 (-0.028 - 0.129) (0.036 - 0.266) (-0.033 - 0.140) (0.063 - 0.188) 
Primary School 0.025 0.122*** 0.007 0.134*** 
 (-0.038 - 0.089) (0.034 - 0.211) (-0.068 - 0.083) (0.078 - 0.190) 
Secondary School 0.149*** 0.316*** 0.059 0.110*** 
 (0.078 - 0.220) (0.206 - 0.426) (-0.018 - 0.136) (0.054 - 0.166) 
High School 0.280*** 0.423*** 0.155*** 0.298*** 
 (0.204 - 0.355) (0.312 - 0.533) (0.076 - 0.233) (0.242 - 0.354) 
University 0.671*** 0.736*** 0.327*** 0.588*** 
 (0.584 - 0.758) (0.599 - 0.873) (0.244 - 0.410) (0.528 - 0.647) 
Tenure 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.007 - 0.011) (0.009 - 0.016) (0.000 - 0.000) (-0.000 - 0.000) 
Female -0.004 0.055 -0.002 -0.133*** 
 (-0.043 - 0.036) (-0.055 - 0.166) (-0.018 - 0.013) (-0.159 - -0.107) 
Age(25-34) 0.099*** 0.452*** 0.121*** 0.308*** 
 (0.057 - 0.141) (0.403 - 0.501) (0.103 - 0.139) (0.292 - 0.325) 
Age(35-44) 0.167*** 0.521*** 0.289*** 0.427*** 
 (0.119 - 0.215) (0.445 - 0.597) (0.270 - 0.308) (0.408 - 0.446) 
Age(45-54) 0.241*** 0.515*** 0.454*** 0.409*** 
 (0.190 - 0.291) (0.412 - 0.618) (0.437 - 0.471) (0.384 - 0.434) 
Age(55-64) 0.373*** 0.494*** 0.628*** 0.270*** 
 (0.298 - 0.448) (0.354 - 0.634) (0.593 - 0.664) (0.228 - 0.313) 
Manufacturing 0.047* -0.463** -0.308*** -0.152*** 
 (-0.009 - 0.103) (-0.901 - -0.024) (-0.338 - -0.277) (-0.236 - -0.069) 
Energy -0.083 0.000 0.103*** 0.268*** 
 (-0.212 - 0.046) (0.000 - 0.000) (0.060 - 0.146) (0.094 - 0.443) 
Construction 0.127*** -0.165 -0.282*** -0.122*** 
 (0.055 - 0.199) (-0.606 - 0.277) (-0.320 - -0.245) (-0.210 - -0.035) 
Trade 0.081** -0.495** -0.416*** -0.229*** 
 (0.008 - 0.154) (-0.934 - -0.055) (-0.449 - -0.384) (-0.313 - -0.145) 
Transportation 0.057* -0.227 -0.139*** -0.135*** 
 (-0.011 - 0.126) (-0.670 - 0.216) (-0.173 - -0.105) (-0.221 - -0.049) 
Finance 0.240*** -0.377* -0.213*** -0.159*** 
 (0.171 - 0.309) (-0.824 - 0.071) (-0.247 - -0.180) (-0.245 - -0.072) 
Service 0.016 -0.535** -0.043*** -0.150*** 
 (-0.042 - 0.074) (-0.975 - -0.096) (-0.074 - -0.012) (-0.235 - -0.066) 
Professional 0.227*** -0.050 -0.058*** 0.467*** 
 (0.165 - 0.289) (-0.189 - 0.089) (-0.079 - -0.037) (0.422 - 0.512) 
Associate Professional -0.164*** -0.237*** -0.251*** 0.187*** 
 (-0.201 - -0.127) (-0.344 - -0.131) (-0.272 - -0.230) (0.151 - 0.224) 
Clerk -0.187*** -0.295*** -0.363*** -0.061*** 
 (-0.270 - -0.104) (-0.405 - -0.186) (-0.384 - -0.341) (-0.098 - -0.023) 
Service-Sale Worker -0.168*** -0.432*** -0.463*** -0.229*** 
 (-0.210 - -0.125) (-0.528 - -0.336) (-0.485 - -0.441) (-0.261 - -0.196) 
Craft Worker -0.113*** -0.237*** -0.393*** -0.162*** 
 (-0.161 - -0.065) (-0.341 - -0.132) (-0.415 - -0.370) (-0.197 - -0.127) 
Plant-Machine Operator -0.228*** -0.239*** -0.460*** -0.092*** 
 (-0.278 - -0.178) (-0.359 - -0.119) (-0.483 - -0.438) (-0.129 - -0.056) 
Elementary Occupation -0.093*** -0.370*** -0.579*** -0.223*** 
 (-0.136 - -0.051) (-0.467 - -0.272) (-0.602 - -0.556) (-0.258 - -0.188) 
Rural -0.002 -0.079*** -0.022*** -0.018** 
 (-0.031 - 0.027) (-0.129 - -0.028) (-0.033 - -0.011) (-0.034 - -0.002) 
Mediterranean -0.136*** -0.333*** -0.018** -0.225*** 
 (-0.168 - -0.105) (-0.389 - -0.278) (-0.032 - -0.004) (-0.245 - -0.205) 
Middle Anatolia -0.102*** -0.209*** -0.013** -0.136*** 
 (-0.127 - -0.076) (-0.264 - -0.153) (-0.025 - -0.001) (-0.155 - -0.117) 
Black Sea -0.136*** -0.204*** 0.027*** -0.163*** 
 (-0.178 - -0.094) (-0.302 - -0.106) (0.014 - 0.041) (-0.183 - -0.143) 
East Anatolia -0.043** -0.238*** 0.025*** -0.229*** 
 (-0.076 - -0.010) (-0.302 - -0.174) (0.010 - 0.041) (-0.249 - -0.208) 
Lambda 0.162*** 0.253*** 0.196*** -0.048** 
 (0.112 - 0.211) (0.145 - 0.360) (0.174 - 0.219) (-0.087 - -0.010) 
Constant -0.170** 0.216 1.735*** 0.589*** 
 (-0.306 - -0.034) (-0.256 - 0.689) (1.636 - 1.835) (0.465 - 0.713) 
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Observations 7781 3784 43383 23751 
R-squared 0.418 0.336 0.541 0.354 
Confidence intervals in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table  5 
WAGE ESTIMATIONS DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER (1988)
   
 MALE FEMALE 
   
VARIABLES FORMAL INFORMAL FORMAL INFORMAL 
     
Literate 0.059 0.187*** 0.039 0.175 
 (0.045) (0.066) (0.105) (0.154) 
Primary School 0.033 0.127** 0.031 0.104 
 (0.037) (0.051) (0.073) (0.108) 
Secondary School 0.147*** 0.463*** 0.194** 0.169 
 (0.041) (0.067) (0.089) (0.135) 
High School 0.312*** 0.584*** 0.331*** 0.286** 
 (0.042) (0.069) (0.104) (0.132) 
University 0.782*** 0.887*** 0.833*** 0.877*** 
 (0.047) (0.081) (0.127) (0.161) 
Tenure 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Age(25-34) 0.064** 0.542*** 0.061 0.267*** 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.038) (0.070) 
Age(35-44) 0.141*** 0.718*** 0.101** 0.129 
 (0.035) (0.047) (0.048) (0.101) 
Age(45-54) 0.274*** 0.726*** 0.072 0.333** 
 (0.031) (0.064) (0.064) (0.159) 
Age(55-64) 0.454*** 0.818*** 0.101 -0.118
 (0.042) (0.089) (0.110) (0.195) 
High Qualified Occupation 0.067*** 0.124*** 0.032 0.323*** 
 (0.016) (0.036) (0.038) (0.076) 
Rural 0.003 -0.098*** -0.024 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.039) (0.077) 
Mediterranean -0.152*** -0.353*** -0.110*** -0.237*** 
 (0.018) (0.031) (0.040) (0.088) 
Middle Anatolia -0.132*** -0.171*** -0.023 -0.369*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.029) (0.083) 
Black Sea -0.164*** -0.129** -0.183*** -0.406*** 
 (0.023) (0.056) (0.052) (0.145) 
East Anatolia -0.070*** -0.198*** 0.003 -0.210 
 (0.018) (0.034) (0.048) (0.136) 
Lambda (Male) 0.217*** 0.594***   
 (0.039) (0.081)  
Lambda (Female)   0.064 -0.035 
   (0.054) (0.101) 
Constant -0.177** -0.170 -0.521*** -1.077*** 
 (0.082) (0.107) (0.161) (0.235) 
     
Observations 6264 3317 1516 467 
R-squared 0.381 0.297 0.455 0.344 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 
WAGE ESTIMATIONS DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER (2007)
   
 MALE FEMALE 
   
VARIABLES FORMAL INFORMAL FORMAL INFORMAL 
     
Literate 0.021 0.038 0.177** 0.217***
 (0.059) (0.043) (0.073) (0.051) 
Primary School -0.012 0.028 0.110* 0.157*** 
 (0.052) (0.040) (0.062) (0.043) 
Secondary School 0.054 0.020 0.217*** 0.149*** 
 (0.053) (0.039) (0.065) (0.045) 
High School 0.150*** 0.238*** 0.454*** 0.347*** 
 (0.054) (0.039) (0.067) (0.045) 
University 0.422*** 0.660*** 0.866*** 0.723*** 
 (0.056) (0.040) (0.078) (0.049) 
Tenure 0.000*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.025***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age(25-34) 0.019 0.318*** 0.257*** 0.207*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) 
Age(35-44) 0.238*** 0.480*** 0.319*** 0.231*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.022) 
Age(45-54) 0.523*** 0.513*** 0.284*** 0.138*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.031) 
Age(55-64) 0.816*** 0.423*** 0.265*** 0.171*** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.052) (0.064) 
High Qualified Occupation 0.312*** 0.305*** 0.330*** 0.447*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) 
Rural 0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.027 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.020) 
Mediterranean 0.025*** -0.226*** -0.016 -0.253*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) 
Middle Anatolia 0.014* -0.143*** 0.042*** -0.111*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.024) 
Black Sea 0.089*** -0.155*** 0.036** -0.215*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022)
East Anatolia 0.136*** -0.208*** 0.049** -0.229*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.034) 
Lambda (Male) 0.344*** 0.198***   
 (0.017) (0.035)   
Lambda (Female)   -0.036 -0.178*** 
   (0.024) (0.030) 
Constant 1.233*** 0.651*** 0.217** -0.189** 
 (0.066) (0.071) (0.092) (0.076) 
     
Observations 33108 18582 10275 5169
R-squared 0.460 0.320 0.593 0.381 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 
OAXACA DECOMPOSITION: TOTAL SAMPLE (based on wage regression in Table 4) 
 
 1988 2007 
       
VARIABLES DIFFERENTIAL EXPLAINED UNEXPLAINED DIFFERENTIAL EXPLAINED UNEXPLAINED
       
Education  0.114*** -0.118*  0.106*** -0.163*** 
  (0.006) (0.056) (0.002) (0.045)
Tenure  0.031*** -0.024  0.000* 0.000 
  (0.003) (0.014)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Female  -0.006*** -0.001  -0.002*** 0.030*** 
  (0.001) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.004) 
Age  0.092*** -0.242***  0.062*** -0.100*** 
  (0.005) (0.025)  (0.002) (0.009) 
Industry  -0.019*** 0.497***  0.062*** -0.075 
  (0.005) (0.148)  (0.002) (0.046) 
Occupation  0.003 0.163**  0.068*** -0.303*** 
  (0.004) (0.050)  (0.002) (0.023) 
Rural  0.003** 0.014*  0.002*** -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.002) 
Region  -0.004* 0.080***  0.004*** 0.090*** 
  (0.002) (0.013) (0.000) (0.004)
Total  0.212*** -0.019  0.302*** 0.624*** 
  (0.010) (0.096)  (0.004) (0.036) 
Formal -0.052***   1.363***   
 (0.006)   (0.003)   
Informal -0.463***   0.725***   
 (0.012)   (0.004)   
Difference 0.411***   0.638***   
 (0.013)   (0.005)   
Adjusted 0.193*   0.927***   
 (0.096) (0.036)  
Constant   -0.387*   1.146*** 
   (0.191)   (0.082) 
       
Observations 11565   67134   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 
OAXACA DECOMPOSITION FOR MEN AND WOMEN SEPARATELY (1988) (based on wage regressions in Table 5) 
 
 MALE FEMALE 
       
VARIABLES DIFFERENTIAL EXPLAINED UNEXPLAINED DIFFERENTIAL EXPLAINED UNEXPLAINED
       
Education  0.100*** -0.141*  0.201*** -0.045 
  (0.006) (0.062)  (0.024) (0.139) 
Tenure  0.029*** -0.056***  0.076*** 0.012 
  (0.003) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.030) 
Age  0.110*** -0.368***  0.044*** -0.083* 
  (0.006) (0.036)  (0.010) (0.039) 
High Qualified 
Occupation 
 0.013*** -0.011  0.039** -0.133*** 
  (0.003) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.037) 
Rural  0.003** 0.019**  0.004 -0.006 
  (0.001) (0.007)  (0.003) (0.016) 
Region  -0.003 0.055***  -0.014** 0.102*** 
  (0.002) (0.014)  (0.005) (0.030) 
Total  0.251*** -0.508***  0.349*** 0.403 
  (0.009) (0.139)  (0.028) (0.227) 
Formal -0.055***   -0.040**   
 (0.007)   (0.016)   
Informal -0.439***   -0.631***   
 (0.013)   (0.031)   
Difference 0.384***   0.591***   
 (0.014)   (0.035)   
Adjusted -0.258   0.752**   
 (0.140)   (0.231)   
Constant   -0.007   0.556 
   (0.147)   (0.291) 
       
Observations 9581   1983   
OAXACA DECOMPOSITION FOR MEN AND WOMEN SEPARATELY (2007) (based on wage regressions in Table 6) 
  
 MALE FEMALE 
       
VARIABLES DIFFERENTIAL EXPLAINED UNEXPLAINED DIFFERENTIAL EXPLAINED UNEXPLAINED
       
Education  0.109*** -0.084  0.200*** 0.080 
  (0.002) (0.066)  (0.007) (0.064) 
Tenure  0.000* 0.000  0.080*** -0.031*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.011) 
Age  0.068*** -0.180***  0.051*** 0.050*** 
  (0.002) (0.013)  (0.003) (0.015) 
High Qualified 
Occupation 
 0.040*** 0.002  0.110*** -0.034*** 
  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Rural  0.001*** 0.001  0.000 0.003 
  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.003) 
Region  0.002*** 0.121***  0.003*** 0.088*** 
  (0.000) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Total  0.220*** 0.442***  0.445*** 0.562*** 
  (0.004) (0.059)  (0.010) (0.066) 
Formal 1.356***   1.386***   
 (0.003)   (0.006)   
Informal 0.738***   0.677***   
 (0.004)   (0.009)   
Difference 0.618***   0.709***   
 (0.005)   (0.011)   
Adjusted 0.662***   1.007***   
 (0.059)   (0.067)   
Constant   0.582***   0.405*** 
   (0.098)   (0.108) 
       
Observations 51690   15444   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1: Share of unregistered workers (without social security) (%). 
    Year  Male  Female  Total 
Total Employment  1988  47  79  56  2007 42 64  48
         
Non-Agricultural 
Employment 
 1988  29  29  29 
 2007 33 34  33
         
Wage Earners  1988  20  16  19   2007   21  22  21 
Source: TURKSTAT 1988-2007 Household Labor Force Surveys 
 
Table A2: Share of employment in workplaces with 10 or fewer employees (%) 
    Year  Male  Female  Total 
Total Employment  1988  66  78  70  2007  60  66  62 
         
Non-Agricultural 
Employment 
 1988  54  38  52 
 2007  52  38  49 
         
Wage Earners  1988 32 21  30  2007   31   26   30 
Source: TURKSTAT 1988-2007 Household Labor Force Surveys 
 
Table A3: Share of unregistered workers (without social security) by firm size (%) 
    Year  <10  >=10  Total 
Total Employment  1988  74 17   56 2007  69 14   48
       
Non-Agricultural 
Employment 
 1988  46 11   29
 2007  54 13   33
       
Wage Earners  1988  48 7   19
  2007   48 10   21
Source: TURKSTAT 1988-2007 Household Labor Force Surveys 
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Appendix 2: Formal and Informal Employment by Age, Occupation and Industry (%)  
Figure A2.1: Formal and Informal Employment by age group 
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Figure A2.2: Formal and Informal Employment by occupation 
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Figure A2.3: Formal and Informal Employment by industry 
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Appendix 3. Multinomial Logit Estimation Results 
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION (MALE-2007) 
     
VARIABLES FORMAL INFORMAL SELF-EMPLOYED/ 
EMPLOYER 
UNPAID FAMILY 
WORKER 
     
Literate 1.133*** 1.069*** 0.722*** 1.684*** 
 (0.140) (0.094) (0.084) (0.361) 
Primary School 2.100*** 1.406*** 1.109*** 1.889*** 
 (0.121) (0.083) (0.069) (0.345) 
Secondary School 2.377*** 1.317*** 1.059*** 1.852*** 
 (0.122) (0.084) (0.072) (0.344) 
High School 2.979*** 1.345*** 1.249*** 2.266*** 
 (0.121) (0.084) (0.071) (0.343) 
University 3.884*** 1.577*** 1.474*** 2.263*** 
 (0.122) (0.088) (0.075) (0.356) 
Not Household Head -0.819*** -0.468*** -0.726*** 2.283*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.167) 
Married 1.281*** 0.829*** 1.182*** 0.915*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.041) (0.080) 
Rural -0.274*** -0.201*** -0.153*** -0.712*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.060) 
Age(25-34) 1.552*** 0.753*** 1.890*** 0.678*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.070) 
Age(35-44) 1.307*** 0.303*** 1.912*** 0.288* 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.051) (0.155) 
Age(45-54) -0.543*** -1.177*** 0.690*** 0.070 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.052) (0.183) 
Age(55-64) -2.828*** -2.502*** -0.348*** -0.506** 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.056) (0.203) 
Mediterranean -0.337*** -0.105*** -0.018 -0.098 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.090) 
Middle Anatolia -0.234*** -0.137*** -0.061** 0.027 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.080) 
Black Sea -0.309*** -0.126*** 0.016 0.208*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.076) 
East Anatolia -0.958*** -0.638*** -0.463*** -0.231*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.073) 
Number of Children(5-14) -0.071*** -0.015 0.033*** 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.024) 
Number of Children(0-4) -0.139*** -0.032* 0.039** 0.169*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.039) 
Household Head(Formal) 0.118*** -0.311*** -0.855*** -1.642*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.086) (0.287) 
Household Head(Informal) 0.043 0.360*** -0.562*** -0.503** 
 (0.057) (0.046) (0.106) (0.254) 
Household H(Employer/Self employed) -0.316*** -0.166*** 0.027 2.975*** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.051) (0.077) 
Household Head(Unpaid F.W.) -0.259 -0.634 2.962*** 2.851*** 
 (0.540) (0.639) (0.329) (0.531) 
Constant -3.420*** -2.020*** -3.446*** -8.661*** 
 (0.126) (0.091) (0.086) (0.384) 
     
Number of observations 125129 125129 125129 125129 
     
Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in parentheses;  (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
           (iii) Not working in the labor market is the base category 
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MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION (FEMALE-2007) 
     
VARIABLES FORMAL INFORMAL SELF-EMPLOYED/ 
EMPLOYER 
UNPAID FAMILY 
WORKER 
     
Literate 1.263*** 0.891*** 0.335** 0.674*** 
 (0.174) (0.102) (0.166) (0.192) 
Primary School 1.607*** 0.555*** 0.637*** 0.693*** 
 (0.147) (0.087) (0.115) (0.149) 
Secondary School 2.160*** 0.645*** 0.887*** 0.777*** 
 (0.150) (0.092) (0.138) (0.173) 
High School 3.242*** 1.255*** 1.182*** 1.134*** 
 (0.146) (0.089) (0.125) (0.160) 
University 5.196*** 1.998*** 2.425*** 1.177*** 
 (0.147) (0.094) (0.127) (0.195) 
Not Household Head -0.402*** -0.185*** -0.846*** 0.894** 
 (0.048) (0.057) (0.082) (0.373) 
Married -0.593*** -1.084*** -0.209*** -0.006 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.074) (0.111) 
Rural -0.075** -0.368*** -0.335*** -0.270*** 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.071) (0.075) 
Age(25-34) 1.157*** 0.608*** 1.925*** 1.053*** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.116) (0.123) 
Age(35-44) 1.201*** 0.275*** 2.243*** 1.177*** 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.119) (0.132) 
Age(45-54) -0.169*** -0.697*** 1.530*** 0.962*** 
 (0.055) (0.065) (0.129) (0.141) 
Age(55-64) -2.069*** -2.170*** 0.258 0.406** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.175) (0.185) 
Mediterranean -0.513*** -0.285*** 0.252*** 0.329*** 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.070) (0.084) 
Middle Anatolia -0.508*** -0.668*** -0.256*** -0.741*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.075) (0.113) 
Black Sea -0.375*** -0.226*** -0.160* 0.177** 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.085) (0.088) 
East Anatolia -1.071*** -1.529*** -0.723*** -1.786*** 
 (0.049) (0.063) (0.099) (0.177) 
Number of Children(5-14) -0.213*** -0.127*** 0.003 -0.099*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.037) 
Number of Children(0-4) -0.525*** -0.584*** -0.325*** -0.386*** 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.056) (0.069) 
Household Head(Formal) 0.411*** -0.164*** -0.163** -0.882*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.074) (0.228) 
Household Head(Informal) 0.046 0.343*** 0.049 -0.455* 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.094) (0.273) 
Household H(Employer/Self employed) -0.484*** -0.410*** 0.171** 2.952*** 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.071) (0.112) 
Household Head(Unpaid F.W.) -72.413 -0.778 -57.976 -63.181 
 (0.000) (0.601) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -4.508*** -2.517*** -5.516*** -8.246*** 
 (0.154) (0.106) (0.173) (0.401) 
     
Number of observations 144837 144837 144837 144837 
     
Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in parentheses;  (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           (iii) Not working in the labor market is the base category market is the base category 
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MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION (MALE-1988) 
     
VARIABLES FORMAL INFORMAL SELF-EMPLOYED/ 
EMPLOYER 
UNPAID FAMILY 
WORKER 
     
Literate 0.223* 0.136 0.329*** -0.447 
 (0.132) (0.134) (0.107) (0.464) 
Primary School 0.898*** 0.491*** 0.536*** 0.726*** 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.088) (0.279) 
Secondary School 0.257** -0.814*** -0.354*** -0.250 
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.107) (0.292) 
High School 0.945*** -0.502*** -0.100 0.299 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.106) (0.295) 
University 1.843*** 0.287* 0.591*** 0.280 
 (0.136) (0.152) (0.131) (0.399) 
Not Household Head -1.274*** -1.139*** -1.318*** 2.114*** 
 (0.092) (0.097) (0.103) (0.371) 
Married 1.210*** 0.681*** 1.259*** 0.805*** 
 (0.082) (0.085) (0.093) (0.142) 
Rural -0.519*** -0.093 -0.290*** -0.996*** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.110) 
Age(25-34) 1.550*** 0.633*** 1.680*** 0.715*** 
 (0.078) (0.081) (0.094) (0.136) 
Age(35-44) 1.050*** -0.382*** 1.257*** 0.058 
 (0.102) (0.110) (0.114) (0.321) 
Age(45-54) -0.921*** -2.095*** -0.037 -0.657 
 (0.102) (0.115) (0.112) (0.411) 
Age(55-64) -2.784*** -3.340*** -1.137*** -2.438*** 
 (0.122) (0.134) (0.117) (0.618) 
Mediterranean -0.226*** -0.182*** -0.066 -0.429*** 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.067) (0.147) 
Middle Anatolia -0.073 -0.448*** -0.522*** -0.216* 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.062) (0.127) 
Black Sea -0.032 -0.604*** -0.247*** 0.120 
 (0.090) (0.105) (0.095) (0.164) 
East Anatolia -0.278*** -0.485*** -0.312*** -0.450*** 
 (0.069) (0.073) (0.071) (0.138) 
Number of Children(5-14) 0.034* 0.028 0.008 -0.020 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.042) 
Number of Children(0-4) -0.046 -0.013 0.035 0.094* 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.051) 
Household Head(Formal) -0.072 -0.171* -1.053*** -1.198*** 
 (0.095) (0.089) (0.181) (0.346) 
Household Head(Informal) -0.091 0.628*** -0.691*** -0.641 
 (0.152) (0.112) (0.252) (0.472) 
Household H(Employer/Self employed) -0.535*** -0.235*** -0.088 2.658*** 
 (0.093) (0.080) (0.108) (0.147) 
Household Head(Unpaid F.W.) -94.897 -39.236 677.552 161.764 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.941*** 0.314** -1.120*** -5.649*** 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.144) (0.466) 
     
Number of observations 21460 21460 21460 21460 
     
Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
           (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           (iii) Not working in the labor market is the base category 
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MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION (FEMALE-1988) 
     
VARIABLES FORMAL INFORMAL SELF-EMPLOYED/ 
EMPLOYER 
UNPAID FAMILY 
WORKER 
     
Literate 0.364 0.174 -0.000 0.672** 
 (0.237) (0.273) (0.244) (0.310) 
Primary School 1.026*** 0.350* 0.317** 0.270 
 (0.160) (0.183) (0.161) (0.252) 
Secondary School 1.585*** 0.021 0.462* -0.833* 
 (0.183) (0.233) (0.241) (0.484) 
High School 3.252*** 1.061*** 0.302 0.254 
 (0.162) (0.209) (0.249) (0.363) 
University 4.777*** 2.425*** 1.670*** 0.487 
 (0.178) (0.252) (0.310) (0.754) 
Not Household Head -0.828*** -0.492** -0.987*** 17.727 
 (0.142) (0.217) (0.220) (0.000) 
Married -0.808*** -1.566*** -0.236 -0.586** 
 (0.095) (0.143) (0.171) (0.238) 
Rural -0.409*** 0.052 -0.260* -0.011 
 (0.097) (0.127) (0.153) (0.192) 
Age(25-34) 1.328*** 0.380*** 1.283*** -0.094 
 (0.094) (0.141) (0.181) (0.269) 
Age(35-44) 1.246*** -0.120 1.008*** 0.053 
 (0.111) (0.191) (0.204) (0.301) 
Age(45-54) 0.070 -1.040*** 0.331 -0.139 
 (0.159) (0.271) (0.244) (0.336) 
Age(55-64) -1.444*** -1.812*** -1.247*** -0.516 
 (0.256) (0.333) (0.402) (0.405) 
Mediterranean -0.294*** -0.693*** 0.607*** 0.349 
 (0.100) (0.152) (0.150) (0.214) 
Middle Anatolia -0.261*** -0.849*** -0.071 -0.439* 
 (0.078) (0.132) (0.155) (0.254) 
Black Sea -0.369*** -0.999*** -0.341 -0.660 
 (0.135) (0.250) (0.296) (0.472) 
East Anatolia -0.550*** -1.567*** 0.192 -0.612** 
 (0.123) (0.223) (0.186) (0.296) 
Number of Children(5-14) -0.178*** -0.003 -0.117** -0.030 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.053) (0.073) 
Number of Children(0-4) -0.267*** -0.175** -0.233*** 0.009 
 (0.057) (0.083) (0.083) (0.102) 
Household Head(Formal) 0.522*** -0.116 -0.005 -0.708* 
 (0.085) (0.130) (0.151) (0.401) 
Household Head(Informal) 0.046 0.474*** 0.006 -38.597 
 (0.130) (0.150) (0.203) (89863821.855) 
Household H(Employer/Self employed) -0.670*** -0.903*** -0.792*** 1.545*** 
 (0.102) (0.147) (0.179) (0.238) 
Household Head(Unpaid F.W.) -40.031 -41.412 2.190*** 2.495** 
 (5.250e+08) (1.237e+09) (0.638) (1.047) 
Constant -3.324*** -2.171*** -3.665*** -22.977*** 
 (0.216) (0.288) (0.296) (0.373) 
     
Number of observations 25006 25006 25006 25006 
     
Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
           (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           (iii) Not working in the labor market is the base category 
